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Abstract
In economic texts, individual differences in saving have often been attributed to varying
thriftiness. Low thriftiness was by many classical and early neoclassical economists associ-
ated with deficient anticipation, impatience, lack of self-control, and weak willpower. The
uncertainty of future consumption which could be perceived differently by individuals did
not always lead to provision for the future. There was a need for something between the
petrxption and the actual behavior of saving money. This was called a desire of
accumulation or a will to postpone consumption and it served as a"prompt to action" .
There is now again an interest in the possible role of volition in the context of saving.
Recent developments in the psychological study of intentions and self-regulation, on one
hand, and behavioral research on time preferences, on the other hand, provide interest-
ing ideas that inform new research on saving behavior. They also stimulate new thinking
about ways of encouraging saving.
' This is a revised version of a paper presented at the Wallenberg Symposium "Will and
Economic Behavior" at the Stockholm School of Economics, April 2-3, 1993. I want to
thank the VSB Project on Savings for providing me with the opportuniry to write this
paper.1
The Virtue of Saving Money
THRIFTINESS
It is often said that households and individuals in the Western industrialized countries
save too little and that people are less thrifty than they used to be(see e.g. Modigliani,
1986). As a consequence there is too little room for investments and there is waste of
resources on immediate consumption. The other view--that there is too much saving--is,
however, held by many who, in the present severe recession, look to Keynes (1936) for
support of their view. Immediately after World War II there was, especially in the USA
and to some extent in Sweden, a fear that a depression would follow and people were
encouraged to spend rather than to save.
I do not propose to settle in this paper the question of who is right, but my own
conception no doubt tends towards the too-little-savings view even for the short run and
definitely for the long run. What I propose to do is to have a look at what saving is and
how indiv?dual factors such as [hose having to do with will can help to explain saving
behavior. Since the best discussions of the psychology of saving are to be found in the
writings of classical and early neo-classical economists, I shall rely a lot on those. For
empirical studies of saving behavior there is much to be learned from their verbal
theorizing about saving.
Saving has through the ages mostly been considered to be a virtue and the virtuous
individual has been characterized as thrifty which by far is not the same as mean or
greedy. Notable exceptions to this high esteem of saving are some of Mandeville's
(1732~1923) and Keynes's (1936) writings. Lea et al. (1987, p.214) ask why saving is so
widely held to be virtuous behavior when in fact there can be ill consequences for a
society if there is too much saving. In a somewhat jocular vein they suggest that saving
is a moral activity because it is difficult to save. Another answer given is that it has been
in the interest of those who inspire moral norms in socicty to promote saving for their
own purposes. In the middle ages, common people were supposed to save money and not
spend all of it on immediate consumption. The King, the clergy and the gentry, all could
profit from such savings (Tuchman, 1979). To ensure that the common people did not
overspend, the so-called sumptuary laws were enacted, at the expense of the merchants.
Those laws regulated in detail how people of different standing in society could dress.
Adam Smith (1776I1982) criticized the sumptuary laws and declared that common
people had an instinct for frugality and could be left alone. Overspending was according
to him something that characterized those governing the country and only they could be
accused of ruining the country's finances.
In his influential book "The sociological theory of capital" which was originally published
in 1834 and then republished in 1905 (under a new title) because of high demand from
economists, John Rae (183411905, p.53) expounded a theory of accumulation of capital.
Many of his ideas were later elaborated by economists like John Stuart Mill (1848),
B6hm-Bawerk (1888I1912), Marshall (1890), and Fisher (1930). Rae captured important
aspects of saving in the following two sentences: "The determination to sacrifice a certain
amount of present good, to obtain another greater amount of good, at some future2
period, may be termed the e-(j`ective desire ofaccumulation. All men may be said to have
a desire of this sort, for all men prefer a greater to a less; but to be effective it must
prompt to action." He had some ideas as to what could prompt to action. The
circumstances that seemed to contribute most to giving strength to the desire to
accumulate were the following three.
"1.The prevalence throughout the society of the social and benevolent affections, or, of
[hat principle, which, under whatever name it may be known, leads us to derive
happiness from the [future] good we communicate [o others.
2. The extent of the intellectual powers, and the consequent prevalence of habits of
reflection, and prudence, in the minds of the members of the society.
3. The stability of the condition of the affairs of the society, and the reign of law and
order throughout it. "
Despite these ideas which have later been elaborated by economist thinkers, the
relationship between desire of accumulation and saving behavior is, to this day, still
puzzling behavioral researchers.
Rae (1834~1905, p.3) stated that it was the task of the philosophers to interpret the facts
of wealth accumulation and to find the causes behind. "However complicated the social
system ofwhich any person engaged in the acquisition of wealth makes a part, he has no
difficulty in tracing the manner in which that portion of it which he possesses has been
acquired, nor in explaining how it forms to him a certain amount of what he calls capi-
tal....Though, therefore, he can easily tell how he got that which constitutes his wealth,
and how to him it comes to be wealth, he will yet probably confess that be is unable to
say what constitutes wealth in general, from whence it is derived, or what are the exact
laws regulating its increase or diminution."
THE CONCEPT OF WILL
Sutmounting the difficulty of postponing consumption resembles what is populazly (and
by some classical economists like Bóhm-Bawerk (1888I1912) called will-power. "Will"
entails the notion of overcoming something difficult. If it is not difficult, it dces not take
much will to do it. A dictionary defmition of will (American Heritage Dictionary, 1979)
runs as follows: "The mental faculty by which one deliberately chooses or decides upon
a course of action; volition: 'Will is the sustaining, coercive, and ministerial power--the
police o„~icer[in man].' (Emerson). Another, to me less fascinating, definition in the same
dictionary puts will equal to determinatíon, diligent purposefulness.
This dictionary definition lays more emphasis on deliberation than on the difficulty of
undertaking the action, but the quote from the pcet Emerson who was a contemporary
of the psychologist William James neatly illustrates that there is more [o will than just
deliberation.
William James (1890~1983, p. 1098) began his chapter on will with the following
definitions: "Desire, wish, will, are states of mind which everyone knows, and which no3
definition can make plainer. We desire to feel, to have, to do, all sorts of things which
at the moment are not felt, had or done. If with the desire there gces a sense that
attainment is not possible, we simply wish; but if we believe that the end is in our power,
we will that the desired feeling, having, or doing shall be real; and real it presently
becomes, either immediately upon the willing or after certain preliminaries have been
fulfilled." In other contexts, James stressed even more the fact that will involved
difficul[ies which could be overcome with some effort. James's definition of will is quite
similar to Aristotle's delineation of choice (Aristotle, 1976, p. 120): "Since, therefore, an
object of choice is something within our power at which we aim after deliberation, choice
will be a deliberate appetition of things that lie in our power. For we first make a
decision as the result of deliberation, and then direct our aim in accordance with the
deliberation." With this interpreta[ion, choice is not equivalent to an observable act or
some particular revealed behavior. It is a process with several steps in a certain d'uection.
The essential characteristic of will is thus that we believe that the desired end is in our
power and that we expect to be able to overcome the difficulties. James's discussion of
will implies that there is a force involving resistance which it requires some effort to
master. In their economic theory of self-control, Thaler and Shefrin ( 1981) picture the
problem as one of conflict between a short-tetm maximizer (the dcer) and a long-term
maximizer (the planner). Some effort is assumed to be necessary for the desire to save
to materialize in actual saving. There are differences between a positive attitude towards
saving, the will to save, and the actual saving behavior, even though, as James suggested,
there is a belief that the end to save is in one's power.
In everyday language will is apparently mostly used in expressions related to will power
such as having a strong will (usually not in a flattering sense) or having a weak will
(which is even less flattering). Will power designates an assumed personality trait with
some stability. To some extent this is equivalent to self-control, a psychological concept
that appears in many personality tests.
Will is not a popular concept in psychology ever since psychology became an experimen-
tal science in the 1870's and especially after functionalism and behaviorism came to
dominate psychological thinking. There is now again some room for concepts similar to
will and there is an increasing willingness among psychologists to explore phenomena
that belong to will. The recent upsurge in research on self-regulation and related
phenomena illustrates this (Karoly, 1993). In attitude research there is a special interest
in an attitude component called "intention." "Intentions are assumed to capture the
motivational factors that influence a behavior; they are indicators of how hard people
are willing to try, of how much of an effort they are planning to exert, in order to
perfotm the behavior. As a general rule, the stronger the intention to engage in a
behavior, the more likely should be its performance." (Ajzen, 1991, p. 181) The concepts
used typically do not cover all the dimensions of will that, for example, James described.
Many psychological attempts to expiain behavior or actions employ the concept of
attitude. Generally attitudes are defined as having three components: belief, affect, and
conation (action tendency). When attitudes are used to predict behavior, the primary
focus today is on the role of a volitional component called "intention." Attitudes are
getterally said to be poor predictors of actual behavioc If attitudes are related to4
intentions and the latter are also allowed to be affected by other influences like social
norms or situations, the predictive power of attitudes increases.
Ajzen and Fishbein ( 1980) sought to improve the predictive power by including more
factors in their model "The theory of reasoned action" such as social norms and focussing
on attitude towards performing an act rather than attitude towards an object. The
dependent variable is behavioral intention which is set as approximately equal to
behavior. Attempts have recently been made to improve the predictions by adding
perceived behavioral control (similar to Bandura's self-efficacy) which contains some
volitional components. The predictions of behavior with this added volitional dimension
have been quite successful (Tesser and Shaffer, 1990, p.489). Now the model is called
"the theory of planned behavior." (Ajun, 1991)
It is inten:sting to note that in the case of purchase plans retrospective interviews always
show that there have been more purchases than planned for. Those who stated in their
first interview that they had purchase plans, to a large extent, but in far from a hundred
percent of the cases, fulfilled their plan to purchase a consumer durable. The majority
of actual purchasers came from among those who said that they did not have any plans.
In the case of saving, it is the other way around. Plans to save aze rarely fulfilled to the
full extent (Katona, 1975). As a rule people plan to save more than what they are
actually able to live up to. Plans to save are not good predictors of actual saving.
Answers to the question whether it is a good time to save money give better predictions
(van Raaij and Gianotten, 1990).
Psychologists tend to mention self-con[rol and ability to delay gratification as possible
explanations of individual saving. Some recent developments along these lines will be
dealt with later in this paper. Most eazlier studies of delay of gratification have been
done with children as subjects. Psychologists have studied individual capacity to defer
gratifications and have found that age, social status, and education are positively related
to the ability to postpone satisfaction as Btihm-Bawerk and other economists had
surmised. Serious criticisms have been directed against many of these studies (see Gurin
and Gurin, 1970). Experiences of opportunities or ra[her lacking opportunities may
explain why immediate rewards are preferred to a large extent: future rewards may be
highly insecure.
Marshall (1890) conceded that low-income, low-education groups were often right in
consuming now rather than accumulating money or goods for later consumption since
there were powerful others who threatened their accumulated wealth. Inflation and
wealth taxation may have similar impact on feelings of uncertainty. In connection with
saving it is an interesting question whether ability to delay gratification and saving habits
are acquired early in life, to what extent they are influenced by examples set by pazents
and by the opportunity structures or opportunity sets available at home.
A Closer Look at Saving
IS SAVING ACTIVE OR PASSIVE?
In economics saving is seen as an outcome, not as a process. Saving is often defined as5
an excess of present income over consumption and it is usually added that the excess can
be used in later periods. This is a passive definition of saving. It is measured at the
aggregate level as the saving ratio which is the ratio between total savings in a nation
and total disposable income. At the individual level, saving is measured as the difference
between net wealth at the end of a period and net wealth at the beginning of the period,
or as income minus consumption.
The classical economists defined and treated saving or the accumulation of capital as an
active process. Smith (1776I1982) envisioned a conflict between present enjoyment and
future profit. Saving meant giving up the fottrter in favor of the latter. Like Rae
(1834I1905), Jevons (1871I1911) and many later economists, Smith saw saving as an
accumulation ofcapital which would give more in return in the future. The accumulation
of wealth was seen as an act of sacrificing something now for being better off in the
future.
The economists thus focused on the use of money, now or in the future. Fisher (1930,
p.5) said: "Money is of no use to us until it is spent." He made a distinction between
spending and investing. "To spend is to pay money for enjoyments which come very soon.
To invest is to pay money for enjoyments which are deferred to a later time." Fisher's
main purpose was to explain how interest rates developed. Some possible reasons for
saving, e.g. for the goal of buying something at a later date or for having a buffer were
of minor interest to him.
The gist of the definitions which picture saving as an action is that saving involves
refraining from consumption of some resource in one period in favor of cottsumption in
a later, usually not exactly defined period. This is illustrated by Keynes's somewhat
jocular statement: "An act of individual saving means--so to speak --a decision not to
have dinner today. But it dces not necessitate a decision to have dinner or to buy a pair
of shces a week hence or a year hence or to consume any specified thing at any specified
date. Thus it depresses the business of preparing to-day's dinner without stimulating the
business of making ready for some future act of consumption." (Keynes, 1936, p.210).
This definition contains the act of providing for the future, but it excludes reasons for
saving as well as goals involving possible uses in the future. There is a sligh[ly negative
tone to the second sentence in the quo[e.
To some extent the views of the interest rate reflect what the economists think of saving.
John Stuart Mill saw interest as the price paid for abstinence (Blaug, 1985). Marshall
(1890I1947) dcfined interest on muncy as "arcward furwailing."Ile notcd thal rclating
interest to abstinence gave the wrong impression and had been ridiculed by some
economists. Karl Marx had, for example, made t'un of the abstinence of Baron Rothshild
as compared to the non-abstinence of a poor worker. It was therefore better to use the
locution "waiting for the enjoyment of material resources."
Bóhm-Bawerk (1888I1913) said that "Present goods are as a rule more valued than
future goods of the same kind and number. "("Gegenw~ rtige Gtï ter sind in aller Regel
mehr wert als kunftige Gtïter gleicher Art und Zahl") (p. 426). From this fact, [he
phenomenon of interest rate in all its shapes was explained. To compensate for the
difference in value, the individual asked for interest, by Bóhm-Bawerk neutrally called6
"agio."The explanation of the interest on capital was simply the influence of time on
human evaluation of goods.
According to the life-cycle hypothesis, which is the dominant theory of saving, wealth is
not in itself a source of utility; the utility derives from the income or consumption that
wealth permits. It is recognized by economists that there can be considerable utility of
wealth itself, only [his insight is kept to side remarks and footnotes so as not to
complicate the reasoning. A case in point is Fisher's footnote, referring to the income
and wealth of Henry Ford: "Ezcept,.....he derives in addition to this obvious income
other less tangible and more subtle income from the sense of possession, prestige, power,
etc., which go with great wealth." (Fisher, 1930, p.27). Here Fisher contradicted his
earlier statement that money was of no use until it was spent.
TYPFS OF SAVING
Different types of savings are often distinguished, depending on where they are invested
or how they are invested. Economists talk about portfolios consisting of bank accounts,
shares, bonds, real estate, antiquities, art, jewelry etc. Portfolio choices can be assumed
to mirror motives for saving since different motives involve different claims on the
liquidity and return of [he investment. Some classifications of saving deal directly with
the degree of activeness or passiveness. Katona (1975) distinguished be[ween three types
ofsaving, based on reasons or motives for saving: (1) contractual saving; (2) discretionary
saving; (3) residual saving.
The category contractualsaving comprises a decision to save and a commitment to save
over some periods. Buying on installmen[ necessitates later regular saving since the debt
must be paid off, life insurance involves a contract to save regularly and usually for long
time periods. Agreement with one's employer or with a bank to deduct a certain amount
each month from the salary and put it in a savings account is another example. Discret-
ionary saving is a new concept. It relates to the room for genuine decisions that many
people in affluent societies have. They can choose between attractive alternatives to
spend money since there is money left after the basic needs have been satisfied. People
may decide to save for many reasons such as wanting to purchase an ezpensive durable,
go on a long vacation or just to have money available if opportunities for attractive
spending arise. Katona (1975) declared that most of saving was "fora rainy day."Saving
surveys show that "to save to have a buffer if something happens" is the most frequently
mentioned saving motive. Residual saving refers to money that has not yet been spent.
It is saved by default rather than planning. This type of saving leads to a need for cash
management.
The concepts of discretionary saving and discretionary consumption were used by Katona
in his critique of Keynes's psychological law (Keynes, 1936). "Keynes's view that habitual
practices influence all consumer expenditures may have been correct a hundred years ago
when incomes were spent mostly on nondurables and services, but today in the United
States expenditures on durables are important and are usually not habitual. Possibly,
then, these expenditures should behave in the same manner as savings are assumed to
behave: An increment in income, not used for habitual expenditures, would then be used
either for durable goods or for saving; when income declines, habitual expenditures are7
not immediately adjusted downward and therefore less money remains either for
durables or for saving."(Katona, 1975, p.70-71)
THE COMPLEX BEHAVIOR OF SAVING
Saving is a complex behavior. Economic theories of saving are nowadays abstract and
based on assumptions that apparently have littie connection with psychological thinking.
The dominating theory, the life-cycle hypothesis, has proved its value in explaining and
predicting savings, but it has also shown itself incapable of explaining many recent
developments in saving ratios (King, 1985; Maital and Maital, 1991).
The lifecycle income is the sum of all an individual's incomes, including gifts and
inheritances and the revenues from wealth, over the whole lifetime. The fundamental
assumption is that individuals essentially want to have the same consumption level in
each period of the lifecycle. In time periods when their income is lower than the average
lifecycle income, they are assumed to dissave'or borrow money which presupposes the
existence of a functioning capital market. When the income is higher than the lifecycle
expectancy they save money. This means that there is little, if any saving in youth when
incomes are usually low and in old age when retirement incomes are lower [han earlier
income. The individual is then expected to dissave to keep up the standard of living.
Most saving occurs between fifty and the retirement age according to the hypothesis.
Over the life cycle saving tends to be humpshaped. Recent surveys indicate that there
are many deviations from what is expected according to the theory. Both old-age
pensioners and young people tend to save more (dissave less) than what is expected.
(Ando et al., 1992).
The role of will to leave bequests is much debated since it is not quite compatible with
the model. Modigliani (1986, 1988) who is the main originator of the life-cycle hypothesis
tries to play down the role of leaving bequests. This can be contrasted to what Rae in
the above quote asserted about the strong desire to communicate good to the next
generation. In the same vein as Rae, Marshall (1890I1947) emphasized the role of family
affection for saving.
From a psychological point of view saving encompasses anticipation which is character-
ized by uncertainty about the future and the act of making a provision for the future.
There is as Rae (1834~1905) observed something between the uncertainty and the act
of saving. He called it a desire and a prompt to action. There is certainly saving that is
more passive than what is implied by the phrase "making a provision."This passive type
of saving is saving by default, what Katona called residual saving. Such saving is less
complex than the cottscious provision for the future. Most discussions of saving deal with
saving as a provision for the future. This means that the important consequences of
residual saving (cash management) are easily forgotten both in theory and practice.
While economic theory has an elegant, generally adopted theory of saving which is all
the time the object of testing and attempts at improvement, psychology lacks a
comprehensive theory of saving. There are some attempts at theorizing at a less abstract,
empirical level (for a review see Wárneryd, 1989). For the present context, Katona's
(1975) model of saving and consumption is of interest. He proposed that economicS
behavior which includes both saving and consumption, is a function of ability (to spend
or save) and willingness (to spend or save).
This definition comprises a volitional component which Katona and his followers have
measured as attitudes at the macro level. There are many fmdings from survey studies
of consumption and saving indicating that the willingness component is important for
explaining and predicting consumption and saving at the macro level (see e.g. van Raaij
and Gianotten, 1990). While willingness to save as used by Katona was a macropsycho-
logical concept, will is a concept that refers to the individual. The main interest in saving
research is focused on savings at the macro level. There is in the background the notion
that it is desirable to have a micro theory on which macro theory is built up. The
classical and many early neoclassical economists used the concept of will in their micro
models. The cottcept of will can be likened to the missing link between uncertainty
perception and action. Further exploring and attempts to measure the concept of will
seem significant for better understanding saving behavior.
In economic theory and more recently in economic psychology (see e.g. Ritzema, 1992),
the concept of time preference is used to designate the comparison ofcurrent and future
utilities. This comparison may be seen to imply an actof will, an actual choice or
decision. Time preference seems a useful concept for describing behavior, but it still dces
not solve the problem of "the prompt to action" in a more general way. I shall later
return to the latest, behaviorally oriented thinking on time preferences.
Self Command and Self-Control
DECLINING SAVING RATIOS AND DECLINING SELF-CONTROL?
Saving ratios (total saving in relation to total disposable income) have been declining in
most Western industrial countries over the last decade. Economic rationality interpreted
as an attempt to maximize lifecycle income dces not necessarily lead to saving.
Equalizing the income available for consumption in each budget period over the life
cycle leads to saving at certain lifecycle stages and to dissaving at other stages according
to the life-cycle hypothesis. If there is no growth, what one age group saves is spent by
another age group according to the life-cycle hypothesis.
In a welfare society it is conceivable that an individual may reach a higher lifecycle
income by not saving money, but by depending on the social benefits to the utmost.
Certain benefits become available on the sole proviso that the mceiver has no wealth or
savings of his or her own. Rather than dissaving from saved buffers, the individual can
rely on temporary aid from social security systems if there is a need. It is hardly likely
that such behavior is very common, but there is sometimes the suspicion that one effect
of social security systems is the removal of incentives to save.
Another way of expressing this is in terms of decreasing self-control. Maital and Maital
(1991) suggest that in welfare societies there has been decreased self-control which may
be responsible for the decline in savings. The reason is that there is less need for self-
control in the old sense since the public sector (and employers) provide maximal security
whatever ill events occur. Why should people then save? The decrease in saving can9
hardly be explained by what Rae (1834I1905) asserted about the role of intellectual
powers and prudence unless it is assumed that there is now less reflection in the society
than earlier ("the extent of the intellectual powers"). Or dces the society have less
stability, law and order than before? Crime rates have undoubtedly climbed in many
Western countries over the last decade. At any rate, in many discussions of individual
saving the concept of self-control appears, mostly without attempts at defming it.
SELF COMMAND
In his "Theory of Moral Sentiments", Smith wrote about self command as enhancing
prudence, a main componen[ of virtue: "The man who lives within his income is naturally
contented with his situation, which, by continual, though small accumulations, is growing
better and better every day. He is enabled gradually to relax, both in the rigour of his
parsimony and in the severity of his application; and he feels with double satisfaction this
gradual increase of ease and enjoyment, from having felt before the hardship which
attended the want of them. He has no anxiery to change so comfortable a situation, and
dces not go in quest of new en[erprises and adventures, which might endanger, but could
not well increase, the secure tranquillity which he actually enjoys."(Smith, 1759, p. 215).
Smith saw prudence as the union of the two qualities of reason and understanding, on
one hand, and self command on the other. He said that, although the principles of
common prudence did not always govern the conduct of every individual, they always
influenced that of the majority ofevery class or order. As an entrepreneur a person with
self command in this sense would be risk averse! Entrepreneurs do not, however, see
risks where others might and they are usually found to be moderate risk-takers.
Smith saw self command as the ability to take the view of the impartial, objective
spectator who could see both the present and the future situation. The more a person
was able [o adopt the way ofthinking of an objective spectator, the more helshe had self
command. Smith more or less recommended that a person had dual selves, one self more
impartial and objective than the other. The relationship between self command and the
other components of virtue--ptudence and benevolence~justice--was that self command
was a prerequisite for their pursuit.
Schelling (1984) spoke of self-command in a somewhat different sense. It signifies a
deliberate choice to accept pain in order to gain something. He assumes that men are
characterized by alternating preferences and that there may be a wish to do away with
some of the alternatives in a binding way and well in advance. 1'he problem is called
"anticipatory self-command" since it consists in finding ways ofexcluding future behaviors
that are not wanted (with the preferences extant now). His examples are fmm a variety
of fields and often refer to everyday experiences. He gives a number ofrecommendations
for strengthening the self-command like enlisting the help of others, refraining from
exposure to attractive stimuli, and blocking possibilities of yielding. In tnany ways these
measures are similar to those that Elster (1977) proposed.
SELF-CONTROL, WILLPOWER, AND PROVISION FOR THE FUTURE
In the writings of the classical economists, discussions of cognitive factors such as
perception of uncertainty as well as conative factors such as desire or even will can be10
found. Some of them rather focussed on the cognitive aspects than on desire or will or
goals. One example of this is Jevons (1871~1911). He did not pay much attention to the
psychological problems of saving when he developed the theory of pain and pleasure
which was the foundation of his utility theory. He talked about the uncertainty about the
future and about what pain or pleasure the future would bring. While he stressed the
importance of anticipation, he recognized that depending on age, income, and social class
people had different power of anticipation (Jevons, 1871~1911, p.35):
"This power of anticipation must have a lazge influence in Economics; for upon it is
based all accumulation of stocks of commodity to be consumed at a future time. That
class or race of inen who have the most foresight will work most for the future. The
untutored savage, like the child, is wholly occupied with the pleasures and the troubles
of the moment; the morrow is dimly felt; the limit of his horizon is but a few days off.
The wants of a future year, or of a lifetime, are wholly unforeseen. But, in a state of
civili7ation, a vague though powerful feeling of the future is the main incentive to
industry and saving."Jevons finished his chapter on pleasure and pain with a brief, but
emphatic discussion of the importance of considering uncertainty, stressing that when
dealing with anticipations it is always necessary to think in terms of probabilities.
It is interesting to note that Jevons picked out the cognitive part of the complex behavior
of saving. The ability to anticipate was the important prerequisite for saving. The
underlying assumption behind this must be that to a rational person anticipation and
uncertainty necessarily lead to the appropriate actions. It may be that the anticipation
must exceed a certain level to tip over behavior.
Bóhm-Bawerk (1888), on the other hand, was more ezplicit about factors that could
mediate between cognition and action, leading to saving acts. His interest concerned time
preferences: why people put lower value on a future good than on an immediately
available one. He was more specifically intent on the questions of why there was interest
on capital and what determined a certain interest rate. He formulated a kind of
psychological theory which came to be known as the impatience theory of saving. The
basic assumption was that people preferred a good here and now to goods in the future
and that they demanded a compensation for abstaining from the good now.
Among the reasons given by Btihm-Bawerk for people's [endency to overvalue the
present good as against the future good, his suggestion of a constantly undervaluing
perspective of the future is of particular interest here. He propounded that three
circumstances lay behind the undervalua[ion: (1) Erroneous beliefs on account of lack
of imagination and ability to understand, (2) Flaws in will, making people prefer a
smaller utility now to a larger utility later, (3) Uncertainty about the future.
Bóhm-Bawerk thus distinguished between cognitive factors and volitional factors; the
latter were factors impeding or expediting the saving act. He carefully pointed out that
a person might "decide on the smaller present good although he knows well enough and
at the moment of choice even specifically thinks that the future payment ["Einbusse"] is
larger and that therefore his choice for his welfare on the whole is unfavorable." (p. 447).
The reason for such behavior was thus not cognitive (having to do with "Wissen",
knowledge) but rather a lack of will ("Willensfehler"). Then Bdhm-Bawerk (p, 447)ii
makes a somewhat surprising statement: "I should not be surprised if the psychologists
viewed also this case as a variant ["Abart"] of the first case: roughly in the way that the
momentary weaker feeling vanquished the future stronger feeling only because the latter,
although present, is not vivid and potent enough so as to be able to occupy our mind for
itself."Báhm-Bawerk, in other words, demonstrated some hesitation about the necessity
of the concept of will and intimated that a cognitive explanation in tetms of the vividness
and potency of the cognition was desired by the psychologists.
While Marshall (1890I1947) mostly referred to personal motivational factors, he stressed
the cognitive aspects of the motivational forces. Talking about the definition of interest
(as a reward for waiting), he said that in other words, the accumula[ion of wealth was
dependent on man's prospectiveness: that is, his faculty of realizing the future. (p. 233).
The growth of wealth "...involves in general a deliberate waiting for a pleasure which a
person has (rightly or wrongly) the power of commanding in the immediate present, and
that his willingness so to wait depends on his habit of vividly realizing the future and
providing for it. "James (1890, p.1182) formulaled a similar problem in somewhat differ-
ent words: "Since a willed movement is a movement preceded by an idea of itself, the
problem of the will's education is the problem of how the idea of a movement can
arouse the movement itself." If movement is replaced by "saving act", this neatly
summarizes the problem of stimulating individual saving behavior.
Marshall seemed to believe in the varying power of cognitive habits rather than in will.
Interestingly he thought that there had been a development towards more prospective-
ness. "The habit ofdistinctly realizing the future and providing for it has developed itself
slowly and fitfully in the course of man's history." (Marshall, 1890~1947, p. 224).
Most saving arose out of family affection according to Marshall, an idea that may have
been inspired by Rae. This involved saving money for the well-being of the family both
before and after one's death. "That men labour and save chiefly for the sake of their
families and not for themselves, is shown by the fact that they seldom spend, after they
have retired from work, more than the income that comes in from their savings, prefer-
ring to leave their stored-up wealth intact for their families; while in this country alone
twenty millions a year are saved in the form of itsurance policies and are available only
after the death of those who save them."
Marshall noted that saving could become a fuced habit so that people continued to save
even though they had no need for ii and might accept to lose money by saving with a
negative real interest rate. "And sometimes the force of habit started when they were
really in need of money, has given them, by a sort of reflex action, an artificial and
unreasoning pleasure in amassing wealth for its own sake" (Marshall, 1890I1947, p.228).
"The greatest savings are made by those who have been brought up on narrow means to
stern hard work, who have retained their simple habits, in spite of success in business,
and who nourish a contempt for showy expenditure and desire to be found at their death
richer than they had been thought to be. "(Marshall, 1890I1947, p.229). Here Marshall
alludes to "desire" to be rich which is as close as he gets to the concept of will in the
context of saving.12
Marshall pointed out a factor that inhibited the will to save, namely, the possible
insecurity of money saved: "The thriftlessness of early times was in a great measure due
to the wanl of security that those who made provision for the future would enjoy it: only
those who were already wealthy were strong enough to hold what they had saved; the
laborious and self-denying peasant who had heaped up a little store of wealth only to
see it taken from him by a stronger hand, was a constant warning to his neighbours to
enjoy their pleasure and their rest when they could." (Ibid., p.226)
Mandeville had seen ftugality in a nation as something arising out of necessity and not
a virtue at all. Smith had seen ftugality as a characteristic that was more or less part of
human nature and operative under most circumstances. Marshall's views are similar to
those of Mandeville ifthey are interpreted to mean that frugality comes out of necessity,
but may continue as a commendable individual habit when it is no longer necessary to
save to the same extent.
FISHER'S IMPATIENCE TO SPEND INCOME VS. OPPORTUNITY TO INVEST
The American economist Fisher (1930) took up Rae's thinking about the accumuladon
of wealth and Bóhm-Bawerk's ideas about the role of time for the evaluation of goods
and developed his own theory of interest. He elaborated the theory of time preference
and found a quantitative way of dealing with time preference as a discounting process
with a constant discounting factor. Fisher's (1930) book had the full title of: "The Theory
of Interest. As Determined by IMPATIENCE To Spencl Income and OPPORTUNIT'Y
To Invest It."He accepted Bóhm-Bawerk's arguments about impatience and elaborated
on them: "Impatience for income, therefore, depends for each individual on his income,
on its size, time shape, and probabiliry; but the particular fotm of this dependence differs
according to the various characteristics of the individual. "(Fisher 1930, p.89). The degree
of impatience affected the utility of future goods and was thus important for the rate of
interest that the individual was supposed to calculate with when discounting the value
of future goods.
Fisher made Bóhm-Bawerk's theory more detailed through listing and discussing a
number of factors that contributed to increasing impatience. Six characteristics make the
impatience to spend greater: 1) short-sigh[edness, 2) a weak will (the lack of self-
control), 3) the habit of spending freely, 4) emphasis upon the shortness and uncertainty
of life, 5) selfishness or the absence of any desire to provide for survivors, 6) slavish
following of the whims of fashion.
The factors that decreased impatience to spend were the reverse ofthe above-mentiorted.
Fisher made a distinction between foresight and self-control similar to that of Báhm-
Bawerk. "Foresight has to do with thinking; self-control, with willing. Though a weak will
usually gces with a weak intellect, this is not necessarily so, nor always. The effect of a
weak will is similar to the effect of inferior foresight." (Fisher, 1930, p.83). The last
sentence indicates tha[ there is some hesitation about the actual role of will; the more
cognitively oriented concept of foresíght may do the job. The personal factots served in
addition to the income factors. Like Jevons and Bóhm-Bawerk, Fisher had the opinion
that certain population groups were more impatient to spend than others. Low age, low
income and low social class were characteristics of such groups.13
According to Fisher the causes leading to high impatience could be influenced through:
(1) training that gives insight into the need for providing "forthe proverbial rainy day",
(2) training in self-control, (3) building up habits of thriftiness, on one hand avoiding
avarice, on the other extravagancies, (4) better hygienic habits and health care which
lead to a longer and healthier life, (5) incentives for taking better care of children and
future generations, and (6) modification of fashion in favor of less ostentatious and
hatmful expenditures for lavish living. Caring for the family was to Fisher one of the
important reasons for saving money, but he did not emphasize it as stmngly as Marshall.
Fisher generalized his observations ofindividual characteristics to whole nations: "Where,
as in Scodand, there are educational tendencies which instill the habit of thrift from
childhood, the rate of interest tends to be low. Where, as in ancient Rome, at the time
of its decline, there is a tendency toward reckless luxury, competition in ostentation, and
degeneration in the bonds of family life, there is a consequent absence of any desine to
prolong income beyond one's own term of life, and the rate of interest tends to be high."
(Fisher, 1930, p.504). A degeneration in the bonds of family life is here again stressed
as an explanatory factor for non-saving behavior. Without such bonds there were no
educational tendencies which instilled the habit of thrift from childhood. Modern
Western societies have been characterized by such dissolution of family bonds since some
time. Fisher did not tell what could be done to make the population of a whole country
less impatient to consume, but presumably he counted on the individual remedies as
being efficient also at the aggregate level.
Time Preference, Precottunitment and Self-Control
SELF-CONTROL AND TIME PREFERENCE
Recent studies in the Netherlands indicate that measurements of people's time
preferences contribute significantly to explaining saving (Ritzema, 1992). Time
preferences were measured on a simple scale, representing different degrees of
impulsiveness-thriftiness, in an interview survey of savings and saving habits.
What is a person's will at a cetiain moment may change to a later date. This common
phenomenon is often referred to as "changes in tastes", something that causes difficulties
in economic theory which has stable preferences as one of its main tenets. When a time
preference has been established through a choice of a plan or an action, the individual
should stick to that choice and not regret it or try to change it. If a person prefers now
to spend on immediate, perhaps lavish consumption, he or she should not the next week
or later regret that the money was not saved. The classical and neoclassical economists
have spent considerable time trying to deal with this problem. It can be formulated in
many ways and there are ways of handling changing preferences in economic analyses.
In the present context the interest is focussed on why people sometimes or even often
prefer to consume today rather than save money for tomorrow.
Jevons, Bó hm-Bawerk and Marshall, all stressed that the value of a future good
decreased very rapidly with the fitst lapse of time and then more slowly. Bóhm-Bawerk
said that in particular when the undervaluation (or lower evaluation of the future good)
was caused by defects of will, there might be a strong difference between an enjoyment14
which offered itself at the very moment, and one which did not. There was, however,
only a small or no difference between an enjoyment which was pretty far away, and one
which was farther away.
As mentioned before, self-control was by the early economists considered to be an
important factor when explaining saving behavior. The degree of self-contml can be
conceptualized as degree of time preference. Persons with low self-control are assumed
to have a strong preference for the present. They can be said to ask a high interest rate
in their discount functions for future events or in more psychological terms be impatient.
A common assumption is that discount functions fall very rapidly at first and then level
off in the long run (see e.g. Jevons, 1871; Ainslie, 1975).
Marshall (189011947, p. 225) wrote: "Cases are not rare of inen who alternate between
eatning two or three pounds a week and being reduced to the verge of starvation: the
utility of a shilling to them when they are in employment is less than that of a penny
when they are out of it, and yet they never attempt to make provision for the time of
need. " In a footnote he added: "They 'discount' the future benefits....at the rate of many
thousands per cen[ per annum."
In a study of Dutch households, Antonides (1988) found that there were differences in
discounting factors between people who saved and those who did not save. For the
former the (by Antonides calculated) monthly discount factor was 0.014 9b while it was
0.026~ for non-savers. Non-savers with an optimistic view of the future had the highest
discount factor: 0.035 ~ per month.
The decreasing value of an object with increasing remoteness in future time, is in
economics expressed as an exponential function with a constant discount factor. (See
Strotz, 1956). From the shape of the discount function it follows that it is easier to
postpone decisions that involve some pain than to put them into immediate effect: "I
shall start saving next year" is a decision that is easier to make than "I shall start to save
as of this moment." In the present economic recession, some governments with budget
deficits have few plans for immediate cuts in expenditures, but plenty of ideas for starting
to save next year and the following years.
A puzzling problem is the question of changing tastes. People may by far prefer A to B,
but still choose B on the basis of its presence here and now, while A dces not become
available until after a long wait. This implies that the discount functions for the two
goods A and B cross somewhere, which they cannot do with a constant discount factor.
It means a change of taste which can only with difficulty be handled by economic theory.
Elster (1986, p. 15) deals with the relation between desires and behavior in a rather
fotmal way: "Akrasia [weakness of the will] is characterized by the following features. (1)
There is a prima facie judgement that X is good; (2) There is a prima facie judgement
that Y is good; (3) There is an all things considered judgement that X is best (4) There
is the fact that Y is chosen. Taking a drink against one's own better judgement is a
familiar example."
The fact that people had a tendency to change their plans over time led the economist
Strotz ( 1956) to suggest a way of describing the phenomenon of changing tastes and also15
to give some advice as to how the individual could safeguard against such behavior when
it was unwanted. He proposed two ways to impose self-control so that undesirable cross-
ings of discount functions could be prevented. People could a) precommit themselves or
b) use the strategy of consistent planning. Precommitment can be exemplified by
Ulysses's behavior in the episode with the Sirens; he tied himself to the mast so that he
could not yield to the temptation. Strotz remarked that unluckily precommitment was
more often of the negative kind. People used credit to consume immediately and were
thus committed to save afterwards. The strategy of consistent planning consists in
choosing the best of the plans that the individual counts on actually being able to follow.
This entails some provision against deficient self-control in the future.
Strotz (1956), agreeing with Bóhm-Bawerk (1888I1912) and Fisher (1930), thought that
the proper discount functions were established early in life through the teaching of
parents and through social pressure from the environment. Children and other
"uninstructive" groups in society were too impatient in their discounting of the future.
Ainslie (1975), a psychiatrist, further expanded Strotz' ideas and related them to
psychological research. Similar to Jevons (1871), Bóhm-Bawerk (1888), and Strotz (1956),
Ainslie (1975) described a discount function that strongly overvalued objects and events
that were close to the present. He suggests on the basis of psychological research, among
other things in animal laboratories, that impulsiveness can be described in tetms of a
discount function, but that the functions do not foliow the course ofexponential functions
with a constant exponent. He concludes that a hyperbola, meaning that the expected
value of the object divided by the time before an object becomes available, is preferable
to an exponential expression. The idea is further developed in a later paper, presented
to an audience ofeconomists (Ainslie, 1991) and in a book with the title "Picoeconomics:
The strategic interaction of successive motivational states within the person" (Ainslie,
1992).
Ainslie (1975), followed by Elster (1977) proposed ways of overcoming the temporary
superioriry of the present as against objects available in the future. They accept
precommitment as one way of overcoming impatience, but point out that another way
was also used by Ulysses, to avoid exposure; Ulysses put wax into his sailors' ears so that
they could not hear the singing of the Sirens. Elster (1977) systematically reviews ways
of establishing self-control. There are several ways of tying oneself or precommitting
oneself as Ulysses did. Sidebets are an example: "I'll give you a hundred dollars ifI can't
save enough for a trip round the world in twelve months. " The ways of strengthening the
self-control are part of a theory of what Elster calls imperfect rationality, meaning that
the individual contrives means of compensating for a weak will or lack of self-control.
Precommitment means binding oneself so that future impulses will not prevail and
avoiding exposure means giving less room for getting new impulses. The tying can be
internal and refer to "challenges" and sidebets which the individual makes to him- or
herself or x rnal so that there is some public that can take the culprit to task in case
of failure to fulfill the commitment. Leading a hermit's life or avoiding environments
with known temptations are examples of the second remedy. Making rules and punishing
for transgression is a third mean of increasing the self-cotrunand.
Although these ideas have not been tested in saving contexts, they give food for thought
about saving behavior. For example, they suggest that people may not actually make16
decisions to save money, but ra[her deliberate on and decide on how to avoid spending
money. They do this by refraining from exposure to temptations or by precommitments
so that it becomes more difficult to spend than to save. The end of this line of thought
is an economic theory of self-control, proposed by the economists Thaler and Shefrin
(1981). The latter have applied their theory to saving behavior. While it may lack
something as a theory of saving (cf. King, 1985), there are some implications of general
interest. The authors assume that self-control is more or less by defmition a question of
conflict between opposing forces.
Similar to agency theory in business economics, the existence of a long-term force, which
the authors call "the planner" and a short-tetm force which they name "the dcer" is
postulated. In agency theory this corresponds to the presumed conflict between hired
managers and the owners of a firm. The planner influences the way money is spent in
each period by setting up rules for the dcer. The authors adhere to the postulate of
rationality. They define saving or any other economic behavior as a conftict and split the
person into two forces, both of which operate rationally, but with different preference
functions. In a manner of speaking this means converting the Freudian theory of the ego,
the superego and the id into the mathematical terms of the economic theory of rationali-
ty.
Self-control involves an effort according Thaler and Shefrin (1981). This asstunption is
elaborated in a more recent version of the theory which is now called "the behavioral
life-cycle hypothesis". (Shefrin and Thaler, 1988). They explicitly relate it to the life-cycle
hypothesis. The planner function in the model essentially has the role of distributing
income over [he rest of the life-cycle. The concept of self-contml is one of the tnajor
aspects of this new model. The authors also use mental accounting and framing to
explain saving processes and outcomes. Exercising self-control is seen as a cost: it takes
some effort, sometimes a lot of effort to postpone consumption. This makes it possible
to express self-control as a behavioral cost which can be studied in the same way as other
behavioral costs, experimentally through varying antecedent conditions and through
survey questions. The authors find that when confronted with savings data the model
makes valid predictions.
NEGATIVE TIME PREFERENCES
Some recent thinking and experimen[al work on phenomena that were in fact touched
upon by some of the classical economists have produced some hypotheses of great
interest in connection with the characteristics of time preferences. A basic idea behind
the new thinking is that people in general prefer improvement to deterioration. They
tend to order things in such a way that a climax is reached rather than to put the best
things first and risk an anticlimax. This implies that a negative time preference may at
least sometimes be possible as an alternative to the generally assumed positive time
preference (the strength of which is, however, assumed to vary). Economic utility theory
predicts that things are rank ordered from most preferred to least preferred and chosen
in that order, given a budget constraint. This new thinking leads to the idea that people
may save money becattse they want future improvements--something to look forward to--
in their standard of living. This again raises the question: where do people get the
strength to live up to such aspirations? Is it enough to assttme that if the perception of17
possibilities for improvement are clear and vivid enough, the appropriate actions will
ensue? Or is it necessary to assume something more: a will (desire) that is strong
enough?
According to Lcewenstein (1987), there are two kinds of utility to consider: the utility
derived from actual consumption and the utility derived from anticipating future
consumption. The latter, ifpositive, is called savoring and if negative, dread. When there
is a preference for an improvement order, some prefen~ed events will be postponed and
some non-preferred events may be wanted earlier. The latter would for example be the
case if a person waits for a painful operation: it is better to get it over with.
Summarizing the research evidence which is still rather slim, Loewenstein and Prelec
(1991, p. 348) state: "Savoring and dread contribu[e to the preference for improvement
because for gains, improving sequences allow decision makers to savor the best until the
end of the sequence. With losses, getting the worst outcomes over with quickly eliminates
dread. Adaptation and loss aversion induce preference for improvement because, over
time, people tend to assimilate to ongoing stimuli and to evaluate new stimuli relative
to their assimilation level. Thus, changes in, rather than levels of, consumption are the
carriers of value. Improving sequences afford a continual series of positive departures
(gains) from one's adaptation level; declining sequences provide a series of relative
losses."
The conclusions cited above seem valid for actions that are sequential rather than single:
"The differences that do prevail should instead perhaps be traced to different styles of
mental bookkeeping, which will alone produce different degrees of impatience even with
a common underlying rate of time preference. Any operation, custom, or habit that
causes the stream ofpurposeful activity to fragment into a series of isolated choices, each
involving a simple intertemporal tradeoff, and each unrelated to a larger plan,
encourages impatient choices. Whereas the integral sequence frame, by fusing events into
a coherent sequertce, promotes concern for the future, thereby creating an appearance
of negative time preference." (Loewenstein and Prelec, 1991, p.351). The implication of
this thinking is that saving acts should not be promo[ed as separate actions. They should
be embedded in sequences that involve improvement.
A similar idea was brought forward by Elster (1986, p.ll):"Ibelieve, however, that a
person who takes his future states as given, rather than something created, is fundamen-
tally irrational. Moreover, I believe a person will be better off by striving for connected-
ness, since only then will he be able to form the long-terrn plans that are a condition for
living a meaningful life, even in thc present."
In a t~ecent paper, Loewenstein and Prelec (1993) elaborate the hypothesis on negative
time preference. They ittdicate that the evidence so far is stronger for the existence of
negative time preference when painful objects or events are involved (dread) than when
the objects or events are attractive. The improvement order is interpreted as meaning
that individuals do not want deteriorations, but rather an even spread of consumption
over time. This is surprisingly similar to the main assumption of the life-cycle hypothesis.18
Concluding Remarks
The concept of will is elusive. Do we need it in the study of saving? It seems to me that
there is a need for a concept which captures the desire "that prompts to action" as Rae
(1834I1905) put it. To a behavioral scientist, it is an important prerequisite that the
concept is amenable to measurement. It seems possible to map perceptions and beliefs
fairly adequately. It is possible to elicit preferences from people, but there is still a
mostly unbridged gap between desire and behavior as faz as measurements are
concetned, despite the progress in research on self-regulation.
The mainstream economists' focus on cognitive factors which has become more and more
pronounced, has often been supplemented with two assumptions as ways of handling the
volitional factors. The first assumption involves that if the cognitive image exceeds a
certain threshold of strength and vividness, actions will result. The secomd assumption
refers to the existence of stable personality characteristics. Some people have been
thought to react forthwith to cognitions that implied action to provide for the future
whereas others have been assumed to react more slowly, if at all. Differences in a certain
personality characteristic, often cailed thriftiness, have been used to explain differences
in reactions and hence in saving. There is as yet little support for such assumptions in
psychological theory, but the idea of stable personality characteristics may be on its way
back (Karoly, 1993).
It is important in the present context that the discussion of the concept of will can lead
to some ideas for practical use. If practical measures are derived from the discussion and
they tum out to be successful, there is some confirmation of the value of the ideas
though not of their validity in any strict sense of the word. This review of some literature
gives hints for the encouragement of saving. The hints derive both from the cognitive
aspects and from insights or hypotheses regarding volition.
It seems obvious that it is important to make the images of the utility of savings vivid
and clear to people. This is implied in the writings of Marshall and several other
economists. In social psychology there is some evidence that asking people to imagine
[he experience they will get if a certain act is performed facilitates conversion (Gregory
et al., 1982; cf. Kahneman and Varey, 1991: experience preference). Fisher (1930) was
confident that the impatience to spend money rather than invest could be mitigated by
means of education and training. He prescribed remedial actions for cognitive as well as
for volitional deficiencies.
Others have directly or by implica[ion advcx.ated the use of rules as means of
vanquishing volitional difficulties. Precommitments of an interpersonal or purely in[ernal
nature may help to some extent (if the difficutty of making [he decision of precommit-
ment is somehow overcome). Removing possibilities through avoiding exposure to certain
temptations is another way (putting wax into one's ears). A difficulty not mentioned
earlier is that household saving is often a matter of interacdon between two or more
family members who tnay disagree more or less vocally about immediate and future uses
of money.
Evidently, many of the economists reviewed here were aware of the existence of19
cognitive, affective and conative (volitional ) factors of import for economic behavior,
notably saving. Although they discussed affects and volition to some extent, their main
preoccupation was with cognitive factors. The main cognitive factor was uncettainty
about the future: uncertainty about the length of life, future work and income, and the
future value of assets. It seems fair to say that the development of economic theory
meant increasing disregard for affects and volition and an increasing reliance on
cognitive factors. The latter were assumed to be subjective, but could and should be
treated as completely specified by objective circumstances.
The so-called cognitive revolution in psychology has led to new knowledge and new
approaches in psychological research. "T'he approach to intelligence and individual
differences is beginning to be modified in an information-processing direction. But we
are just beginning to see that, because of the strong dependence of intelligence on stored
knowledge, cognitive and social psychology must be brought much closer together than
they have been in the recent past. When we have made these new connections solid, the
challenge will remain of bringing affect and emotion more centrally into the picture."
(Simon, 1990, p. 18). It will still take some time before the questions about the will to
save money can be properly answered!20
REFERENCES
Ainslie, G. (1975). Specious rewards. A behavioral theory of impulsiveness and impuls
control. Psvchological Bulletin, 82, 463-496.
Ainslie, G.(1991). Derivation of "Rational economic behavior from hyperbolic discount
curves. American Economic Review. 81, AEA Papers and Proceedings, May, 334-340.
Ainslie, G. (1992). Picoeconomics: The strategic interaction of successive motivational
states within the ~erson. Cambridge: Cambridge Universiry Press.
Ajzen, I. (1991). The theory of planned behavior. OrQanizatioaal Behavior and Human
Decision Processes, 50, 179-211.
Ajzen, I. and M. Fishbein (1980). Understanding attitudes and predicting social behavior.
Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Ando, A., L. Guiso, D. Terlizzese and D. Dorsainvil,(1992). Saving among young
households. Evidettce from Japan and Italy.Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 94,233-
250.
Antonides, G. (1988). Scrappine a durable consumption good. Doctoral dissertation.
Erasmus University Rotterdam
Aristotle (1976). The ethics of Aristotle The Nicomachean ethics. Harmondsworth,
Middlesex, England: Penguin Books.
Blaug, M. (1985). Economic theory in retrosp~t. 4th ed. Cambridge, England:
Cambridge University Press.
Bóhm-Bawerk, E. von (1888I1912). Positive Theorie des Ka~itales. Dritte Auflage.
Zweiter Halbband. Innsbtvck: Verlag der Wagner'schen Universitá ts-Buchhandlung.
(First published in 1888).
Elster, J. (1977). Ulysses and the Sirens: a theory of imperfect rationality. Social Science
Information, 16, 469-526
Elster, J. (1986). Introduction. In J. Elster (ed.), Rational Choice. Oxford: Basil Black-
well. Pp. 1-33.
Fisher, I. (1930). The theorv of interest. London: Macmillan
Gregory, L.W., R. B. Cialdini, and K.M. Carpenter (1982). Self-relevant scenarios as
mediatars of likelihood estimates and compliance: Dces imagining make it so? ou
of Personality and Social Psycholoev, 43, 89-99.
Gurin, G. and P.Gurin (1970). Expectancy theory in the study of poverty. Joumal of
Social Issues, 26, 83-104.21
Hayek, F.A. (1978~1985). New studies in~hilosophy, nolitics, economics and the historv
of i e . Chicago, IL and London: The University of Chicago Press and Routledge 8c
Kegan Paul Ltd.
James, W. (1890I1983). The Qrinciples of psvchology. Cambridge MA: Harvard
University Press.
Jevons, W.S. (1911I1871). The theory of political economy. 4th ed. London: Macmillan
and Co., Limited. (First published in 1871).
Kahneman, D. and C. Varey (1991). Notes on the psychology of utility. In: J. Elster and
J. Rcemer (eds.), Interpersonal com~arisons of well-being. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press. Pp. 127-163.
Karoly, P. (1993). Mechanisms of self-regulation: a systems view. Annual Review of
l~choloev, 44, 23-52.
Katona, G. (1975). ~chological economics. New York, NY: Elsevier.
Keynes, J.M. (1936). The eeneral theory of emalovment interest and monev. London:
Macmillan.
King, M. (1985). The economics of saving: A survey of recent contributions. In: K.J.
Arrow and S. Honkapohja (eds.), Frontiers of economics, Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd.
Pp. 227-294.
Lea, S.G., Tarpy, R.M. 8t Webley. P. (1987). The individual in the economv. A survev
of economic nsvcholoev. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lcewenstein, G. (1987). Anticipation and the evaluation of delayed consumption. The
Economic Journal, 97, September, 666-684.
Lcewenstein, G. (1988). Frames of mind in intertemporal choice. Management Science,
34, February, 200-214.
Lcewenstein, G. and D. Prelec (1991). Negative time preference. American Economic
Review, 81, AEA Papers and Proceedings, May, 347-352.
Lcewenstein, G. and D. Prelec (1992). Preferences for sequences of outcomes.
P~vcholoeical Review, 100, 91-108.
Maital, S. and S. Maital (1991). Is the future what it used to be? A behavioral theory of
the decline of saving in the West. In: G. Antonides, W. Arts, and W.F. van Raaij (eds.).
The consumQtion of time and the timing of consumption: towazd a new behavioral and
socio-economics. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Mandeville, B. (1732I1924). The Fable of the Bees: or Private Vices. Publick Benefits.
With a commentary- critical historical and explanatory bv F B Kave. Vols. 1 and 2.22
London: Oxford Universiry Press. (First published 1712 to 1732).
Marshall, A. (1890I1947). Principles of economics: An introductory volume . 8th ed.
London: Macmillan ,First published in 1890.
Mill, J.S. (1848I1985). Principles of political economy. with some of their applications
to social ~hilosophv. Hat~rtondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books.
Modigliani, F. (1986). Life cycle, individual thrift and the wealth of nations. (Nobel
Lecture delivered in Stockholm, Sweden, December 9, 1985). American Economic
Review, 76, 297-313.
Modigliani, F. (1988). The role of intergenerational transfers and life cycle saving in the
accumulation of wealth. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2, Spring, 15-40.
Rae, J. (1834I1905). The socioloeical theory of capital. New York: The Macmillan Co.
Ritzema, J. (1992). An extended and behavioral life cycle model. Dept. of Economic
Sociology and Economic Psychology, Erasmus Universitei[ Rotterdam. Unpublished
manuscript.
Schelling, T. (1984). Self-command in practice, in policy, and in a theory of rational
choice. American Economic Review, 74, Papers and Proceedings, May, 1-11.
Scitovsky, T. (1986). Htunan desire and economic satisfaction. Essays on the frontiers of
economics. New York and London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
Shefrin, H.M. 8~ Thaler, R.H. (1988). The behavioral life-cycle hypothesis. Economic
Inquirv, 26, 609-643.
Simon, H. (1990). Invariants of human behavior. Annual Review of Psychology, 41, 1-19.
Smith, A. (1759I1982). The theory of moral sentiments. (Edited by D.D. Raphael 8c A.L.
Macfie). Indianapolis, IN: Libetty Classics.
Smith, A. (1776I1982). An incLuirv into the nature attd causes of the wealth of nations.
Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin. (First published in 1776).
Strotz, R.H. (1956). Myopia and inconsistency in dynamic utility maximization. Review
of Economic Studies, 23, no. 3, 165-180.
Tesser, A. and D. Shaffer (1990). Attitudes and attitude change. Annual Review of
~cholocy, 41, 479-523
Thaler, R.H. 8c Shefrin, H.M. (1981). An economic theory of self-control. Journal of
Political Economv, 89, 392-406.
Tuchman, B.W. (1979). A Distant Mitror The Calamitous 14th Centurv. Harmonds-23
worth, Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd.
Van Raaij, W.F.,and H.J. Gianotten (1990). Consumer confidence, expenditure, saving,
and credit. Journal of Economic Psychologv, 11, 269-290
W~rneryd, K.-G. (1989). On the psychology of saving: An essay on economic psychology.
Journal of Economic Psychology, 10, 515-541.Uiscussfnn Yaper Series, CentER, Tllburg University, The Netherlands:
(For previous papers please wnsult previous discussion papers.)
No. Author(s)
91fi0 R.M.W.1. Beetsma









91G5 Q.H. Vuong and
W. Wang
9166 D.O. Stahl II
91G7 D.O. Stahl 11
9168 T.E. Nijman and
F.C. Pnlm
9169 G. Asheim
9170 H. Carlsson and
E. van Damme
9201 M. Verbeek and
Th. Nijman
9202 E. Bomhoff
9203 J. Quiggin and
P. Wakker




9207 M. Verbeek and
Th. Nijman
Title
Bands and Statistical Properties of EMS Exchange Rates: A
Monte Carlo Investigation of Three Target Zone Models
Centralized and Decentralized Decision Making on Social
lnsurance in an Integrated Market Multilateral Institutions
Sovereign Debt, Creditor-Country Governments, and
Multilatera! Institutions
The Missing Equilibria in Hotelling's Location Game
The Stable Value
Selecting Estimated Models Using Chi-Square Statisticx
Evolution of Smart, Players
Strategic Advertisingand Pricing with Sequential Buyer Search
Recent Developments in Modeling Volatility in Financial
Data
Individual and Collective Time Consistency
Equilibrium Selection in Stag Hunt Games
Minimum MSE Estimation of a Regression Model with
Fixed Effects from a Series of Cross Sections
Monetary Policy and Inflation
The Axiomatic Basis of Anticipated Utility; A Clarification
Strategies for Growth in a Macroeconomic Setting
Money and Specialization in Production
Applied Nonparametric Models
Incomplete Panels and Selec.Kion Bias: A SurveyNo. Author(s)
9208 W. H~irdle and
A.B. Tsybakov
9209 S. Albaek and
P.B. Overgaard
9210 M. Cripps and
J. Thomas
9211 S. Alb:ek
9212 T.J.A. Storcken and
P.H.M. Ruys
9213 R.M.W.J. Beetsma and
F. van der Ploeg
9214 A. van Soest






9218 P. Borm, H. Keiding,
R. Mclean, S. Oortwijn
and S. Tijs
9219 J.L. Horowitz and
W. HSrdle
9220 A.L. Bovenberg
9221 S. Smulders and
Th. van de Klundert
9222 H. Bester and
E. Petrakis







How Sensitive Are Average Derivatives?
Upstream Pricing and Advertising Signal Downstream
Demand
Reputation and Commitment in T'wo-Person Repeated
Games
Endogenous Timing in a Game with Tncomplete Information
Extensions of Choice Behaviour
Exchange Rate Bands and Optimal Monetary Aaommodation
under a Dirty Float
Discrete Choice Models of Family Labour Supply
On Durable Goods Monopolies and the (Anti-) Coase-
Conjecture
Indexation of Pensions in Hungary: A Simple Cohort Model
Credible Equilibria in Games with Utilities Changing
During the Play
The Compromise Value for NTU-Games
Testing a Parametric Model against a Semiparametric
Alternative
Investment-Promoting Policies in Open Economies: The
Importance of Intergenerational and International
Distributional Effects
Monopolistic Competition, Product Variety and Growth:
Chamberlin vs. Schumpeter
Price Competition and Advertising in Oligopoly
Monotonic Games are Spanning Network Games
A "Mistuken 7'heories" Refinement
Robust Selection of Equilibria
Economically Applicable Evolutionary GamesNo. Author(s)
9227 E. Bomhoff
9228 P. Borm, G.-J. Otten
and H. Peters
9229 H.G. Bloemen and
A. Kapteyn
9230 R. Beetsma and
F. van der Ploeg
9231 G. Almekinders and
S. Eijffinger
9232 F. Vella and
M. Verbeek
9233 P. de Bijl and
S. Goyal
9234 J. Angrist and
G. lmbens
9235 L. Meijdam,
M. van de Ven
and H. Verbon
9236 H. Houba and
A.de Zeeuw




9240 F. Drost and
Th. Nijman
9241 R. Gilles, P. Ruys
and J. Shou
9242 P. Kort
9243 A.L. Bovenberg and
F. van der Ploeg
9244 W.G. Gale and
J.K. Scholz
Title
Four Econometric Fashions and the Kalman Filter
Alternative - A Simulation Study
CoreImplementation in Modified Strong and Coalition Proof
Nash Equilibria
TheJoint Estimation ofa Non-Linear LabourSupply Function
anda Wage Equation UsingSimulated ResponseProbabilities
Does Inequality Cause Inflation? - The Political Economy of
Inflation, Taxation and Government Debt
Daily Bundesbank and Federal Reserve Interventions
- Do they Affect the Level and Unexpected Volatility of the
DM~S-Rate?
Estimating the Impact of Endogenous Union Choice on
Wages Using Panel Data
Technological Change in Marketswith Network Externalities
Average Causal Response with Variable Treatment Intensity
Strategic Decision Making and the Dynamics of Government
Debt
Strategic Bargaining for the Control ofa Dynamic System in
State-Space Form
Tests of Independence in Parametric Models: With
Applications and Illustrations
Individual Income, Incomplete Information, and Aggregate
Consumption
A Model of Lalwur Supply with Job Offer Restrictions
Temporal Aggregation of GARCH Processes
Coalition Formation in Large Network Economies
The Effects of Marketable Pollution Permits on the Firm's
Optimal Investment Policies
Environmental Policy, PublicFinance and the Labour Market
in a Second-Best World
IRAs and Household SavingNo. Author(s)










9251 S. Eijffinger and
E. Schaling




9301 N. Kahana and
S. Nitzan
9302 W. Giith and
S. Nitzan




9306 B. Peleg and
S. Tijs
9307 G. [mbens and
A. Lancaster
9308 T. EUingsen and
K. Wárneryd
Title
Robust Tests for Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation
Using Score Function
The Long Memory and Variability of Inflation: A
Reappraisal of the Friedman Hypothesis
A Generalized Method of Moments Estimator for Long-
Memory Processes
Partisanship as Information
The Welfare Effects of Individual Retirement Aocounts
Job Search Theory, Labour Supply and Unemployment
Duration
Central Bank Independence: Searching for the Philosophers'
Stone
Environmental Taxation and Labor-Market Distortions
Perm:~nent lncome, Current Income and Consumption:
Evidence from Panel Data
Imperfect Credibility of the Band and Risk Premia in the
European Monetary System
CredibJity and Duration of Political Contests and the Extent
of Rent Dissipation
Are Moral Objections to Free Riding Evolutionarily Stable?
Some Peculiarities of Group Decision Making in Teams
Euler Equations in Micro Data: Merging Data from Two
Samples
A Simple Justification of Qu:mtity Competition and the
Cournot-Oligopoly Solution
The Consistency Principle For Games in Strategic Fotm
Case Control Studies with Con[aminated Controls
Foreign Direct Investment and the Political Economy of
ProtectionNo. Author(s)
9309 H. Bester
9310 T. Callan and
A. van Soest
9311 M. Pradhan and
A. van Soest





9315 F. C. Drost and





9318 M.J.G. van Eijs
9319 S. Hurkens
9320 I.J.G. Lemmen and
S.C.W. Eijffinger




Price Commitment in Search Markets
Female Labour Supply in Farm Households: Farm and
Off-Farm Participation
Formal and Informal Sector Employment in UrF~an Areas of
Bolivia
Marginalization and Contemporaneous Aggregation in
Multivariate GARCH Processes
~ommunication, Complexiry, and Evolutionary Stability
Consumption over the Life Cycle and over the Business
Cycle
A Note on Robinson's Test of Independence
On Games Corresponding to Sequencing Situations
with Ready Times
On Ultimatum Bargaining Experiments - A Personal Review
On the Determination of the Control Parameters of the
Optimal Can-order Policy
Multi-sided Pre-play Communication by Burning Money
The Quantity Approach to Financial Integration: The
Feldstein-Horioka Criterion Revisited
Environmental Quality and Pollution-saving Technological
Change in a Two-sector Endogenous Growth Model
The Will to Save Money: an Essay on Economic PsychologyP.O. BOX 90153, 5000 LE TILBURG, THE NETHERLAND:
Bibliotheek K. U. Brabant
~ir~~~~ir~u~~~wma